People Do Need Self-Esteem
People Do Need Self-Esteem
Crocker
and Nuer’s response to Pyszczynski’s study on terror management theory (TMT)
and why people need self-esteem is incorrect. They claim that self-esteem is not needed by individuals and
that self-esteem only gets in the way of people ultimately achieving their real
goals. TMT takes the assumption that
everyone needs self-esteem but questions why we need it. Crocker uses this as
the base of her argument and asks the question if we even need self-esteem at
all?
People Do Need Self-Esteem
It
is argued by Crocker and Nuer that pursuing self-esteem actually creates
anxiety rather than becoming a means to reduce anxiety. When challenged and
when a person’s self-esteem is on the line people will be motivated to do
better and will often push themselves succeed, but this creates further anxiety
on that person altogether. It is true that when people accomplish certain goals
their self-esteem receives a temporary boost, but the issue with Crocker is
that this boost is only temporary and anxiety will once again return when
life’s next challenge comes up. Crocker is mistaken in the idea that all
anxiety is bad. The anxiety and stress that is brought upon by everyday
challenges is good; this stress is brought upon by the need to remain in
homeostasis-being in balance-and is a natural response for all animals when
faced with challenges (Sapolsky 2000). The only issue with dealing with stress
to stay in balance is that sometimes people may stress over issues that do not
deserve stress and that may cause biological and psychological harm. What is an
understandable but still an incorrect assumption by Crocker is that people always
handle all stress in the same way. Not all stress is as serious as certain
other stress. Stress relating to life and death is a very serious issue for the
person who is thinking about it, this sort of stress is not relatable to the
stress of passing an academic class, buying a new car, or having a new romantic
relationship (everyday stress). Everyday stress comes and goes, and increases
and decreases on a regular basis, but the stress over death is a much heavier
burden to deal with and although everyday stress may cause people to feel
depressed at times subconsciously we remain positive and optimistic with some
self-esteem; it is the only way to wake up every morning and find value in
everyday accomplishments. Without any
sort of positive self-esteem a person would not find reason to live (since
death is inevitable) and would likely kill themselves. Crocker claims
self-esteem is a way to deal with anxiety over death, but it does not get us
anywhere. The fact that we live another day to experience life is a good enough
result of maintaining a positive self-esteem.
Crocker
and Nuer’s second point to why people don’t need self-esteem is that
self-esteem only gets in the way of people achieving goals; it does not help
accomplish them. Crocker brings up the valid point that on occasion people tend
to get into bad habits of self-handicapping themselves (creating obstacles and
impossible situations as an excuse for failure) to maintain their self-esteem.
However, that is only one part of the story. Yes, many people create their own
obstacles and create excuses, but if a goal is important enough people will
find a way to accomplish it no matter what. Sometimes protecting the Ego is
more important, but when people realize that their other goals are more
important it does not matter what they look like to other people, they will
ignore other’s opinions and set their Ego aside to work hard for the goal they
want. Crocker again assumes that people do either one of two things; one,
immediately concentrate on preserving their self-esteem over their goals and
two, only attempt their goals because it is rewarding to the Ego and gives a
“high” once accomplished. Some people may fail at first and give excuses, but
some people may recognize the importance of the goal immediately and give it
their all no matter how foolish it looks to the outside world. Other goals are
rewarding yes, but are done because they must be done; a mother learning to
finally breast feed her child for instance or temporarily working a minimum
wage job to make sure the goal of paying the rent is accomplished.
Crocker
and Nuer’s third point to why self-esteem isn’t necessary is that people can
create secure attachments in order to deal with anxiety. Crocker uses the
example of a child receiving the attention of a caregiver as a secure
attachment. Although to some extent Crocker is correct; healthy attachments do
help ease anxiety. These attachments are meant to support, but are also meant
to show a child how to manage anxiety on his/her own one day. Constant care or
over protection can cause dependency. If a child is fully dependent on a
caregiver that child will then find anxiety when that caregiver is not
available. So, if a person becomes dependent to someone else (secure
attachment) there will still be anxiety over death when that person is not
available. This attachment not being available can cause someone to again have
anxiety over death, but may feel even worse about it because they do not have
their secure attachment to depend on.
Croker
and Nuer further argue that only by setting clear inclusive goals can someone
achieve goals without any self-esteem. The example of public speaking was used
and the fact that many people who hate or fear speaking publically do it every
day. Crocker states that only by letting go of having an Ego or self-esteem can
one say “So what?” and face the fear of public speaking without caring if
he/she looks foolish. Crocker is again incorrect because the act of doing
something that is embarrassing takes a lot of courage and self-esteem. In fact
only people who have accomplished their fears (public speaking) can look at
themselves and can realize that they were overreacting to their fears. Once a
person knows they are able to accomplish goals with/without fear some
self-esteem is created. People may still have anxiety but the more times this
goal is accomplished (public speaking) the easier it will become and
self-esteem will continue to grow.
Crocker
and Nuer continue to challenge TMT by questioning whether death is the real
cause of anxiety in the first place and if there is an alternative view to
death. Crocker argues that it is not death but it is the desire to find meaning
and purpose that cause anxiety. This is a very good point, yet, one cannot
argue one without the other. Death is a certainty, but what happens to us, what
we feel and experience (if anything) after death is not. It is true that some
people may view death as an inspiration to work harder and enjoy the precious
moments we have now, but the fact is that anxiety comes to us because we all
want to find a purpose and it also involves finding that purpose before we die. We do not know
what will happen after death and not finding our purpose before we die is the
real cause of anxiety. Both fears are related, and even after discovering what
we think is our purpose we may still find ourselves in fear or having anxiety
because we are not sure we will accomplish them before we die.
In
conclusion, terror management theory is still a valid hypothesis for why we
experience and how we manage anxiety. Death is still involved as the main
reason for our anxiety and although it is possible for us to use death as a
positive motivator to accomplish our goals, the fact still remains that death
is the cause of our anxiety and maintaining some level of self-esteem is the
only way to manage this fear and anxiety.
Crocker,
J., & Nuer, N. (2003). The relentless quest for self-esteem. Psychological
Inquiry, 14,31-34.
Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (in press). The
costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin.
Crocker, J., Sommers, S. R., & Luhtanen, R.
K. (2002). Hopes dashed and dreams fulfilled:
Contingencies
of self-worth and admissions to graduate school. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28, 1275-1286.
Pyszczynski, et al. (2004)
Piaget’s
Theory of Development Involving Human Intelligence Incorporates Schemas
Piaget’s theory
of development involving human intelligence incorporates the concept of
schemas. Schemas are mental representations of ideas, concepts, and objects. As humans we make great efforts to achieve
or obtain something to be in a state of understanding and equilibrium. When
information is not understood we move into a state of disequilibrium, a feeling
of discomfort from unfamiliar information, which drives us to assimilate and
accommodate our schemas to return to a state of equilibrium. To Piaget,
development = increase and increase complexity of schemata which are the force
that keeps us motivated through learning. We strive to be at equilibrium, we do
not like frustration of dealing with unfamiliar knowledge. Equilibrium: when a child’s schema is capable
explaining what he/she perceives form outside world. Disequilibrium: when child
experiences new information/ stimuli for the first time. Unsure how to process
information and begins to create or expand existing schemas.
Piaget’s Theory of
Development Involving Human Intelligence Incorporates Schemas
Schemas
are mental representations of ideas, concepts, and objects. An important aspect
to the concept of schemas is assimilation
which is using an existing schema to deal with/understanding new objects,
situations, and information. Also equally important is the concept of
accommodation which involves altering existing schemas to develop more complex
ones or even brand new schemas altogether to deal/with understanding new
information. Lastly, the concept equilibrium is when a schema is fully capable
of explaining and interpreting information that is perceived form the outside
world. As humans we strive to be in a state of understanding and equilibrium.
When information is not understood we move into a state of disequilibrium, a
feeling of discomfort from unfamiliar information, which drives us to
assimilate and accommodate our schemas to return to a state of equilibrium. To
Piaget, development equaled an increased complexity of schemas or schemata .
Piaget’s
theory of development also includes four specific stages of development that
are biologically universal to all children. The first stage is the sensorimotor
stage (0-2 years). Children in this stage have a cognitive system that is
limited to the motor reflexes while infants
are busy discovering relationships between their bodies and the environment. The second stage is the preoperational
stages (2-6) during this stage, children start to use mental imagery and
language. Children here are very egocentric. Piaget claims children in this
stage are not able to comprehend cardinality and ordinality (the ability to
realize equal quantities) The third stage is the concrete operational (7-11
years) at this stage the child can see and reason with concrete knowledge but
still can not see the summary side of things and fully develop all the possible
outcomes. They can understand conservation of number like the measure of mass,
weight, area and volume. Lastly, the fourth stage is the formal operational
(11+ years) this stage is where children are definitely able to think logically
and theoretically. They could use symbols that are related to the concepts and
easily how problems would be solved. ” To Piaget, this was the ultimate stage
of development. He also believed that even though they were here, they still
needed to revise their knowledge base. Children by this stage are
self-motivators. They learn from reading
and trying out new ideas as well as form helping friends and adults. Piaget
believed that not everyone reaches this stage of development.
Definition of
numbers, Piaget’s idea of a child‘s
ability to understand number includes the capability to compare sets – child’s
ability to give the correct answer of equality when items are positioned in
one-to-one ratio and if child was able to judge equality when there were fewer
then 4-5 items in a set. (Intuitive numbers 1-5). Also important, was the
concept of counting sets. Children would count and recount items in a row using
words that represented numbers such as “one, two, three” etc. known as counting
words. Children learned that the last word used was the expected value outcome
of the set. So although the children were able to give the appropriate (number)
(#) word as their response regardless of the changing appearance of a row,
Piaget believed this did not prove comprehension of number. A child being able
to repeat the counting word as the correct answer did not guarantee that the
child realized the quantity is equal
both times. Tests regarding the abilities stated above were designed to see if
children had an understanding of the cardinal property of number,
but Piaget’s theory of what it means for a child to comprehend number is more
than just a test of cardinality. Later work by one of Piaget’s collaborators
incorporated the study of ordinality, a child’s ability to understand equality
using continuous as well as discontinuous item (qualities). Ordinal included
having a child agree that a set of 30 blocks was larger than a set of 6 blocks
(discontinuous amount) blocks from the large set are dumped down a slide, and
children are unable to recognize that the new pile forming at the bottom will
eventually contain the exact same quantity as the original small set of 6
blocks. They were unable to relate the equality of the new continuous set being
formed to the discontinuous set of 6.
Point one: Critics of Piaget claim that he did
not play an influential role in the development of child psychology and they
could not be more wrong. His critics are wrong because for one, they over
simplified Piaget’s theory of child understanding of number. Critics conducted
their own research (Gelmen, 1972; McGarrigle &Donaldson, 1975 Mehler &
Bever 1967) and found that children as young as 3 were not deceived by the
changing appearance of a set and were able to give the correct answer regarding
equality. This opposed Piaget’s research, however, although these young
children who were still in the preoperational stage were able to provide the
correct answer there is no agreement regarding which operational level was
required to perform these new conservation tasks. Children involved in post-Piaget
research could have easily counted the items in the sets because fewer items
were used in these sets as compared to the sets in Piaget’s research. Children
could have also relied on they’re natural ability to perceive small numbers
(intuitive numbers) (Benat, Lehalle,
& Joven 2004). Without
agreement as to which operational level was required to complete the tasks,
children from different operational stages could have completed the tasks
making the post-Piaget research incomparable to Piaget’s.
The second argument used by Piaget’s critics is
that many young children still in the preoperational stage of development had
the ability to count in general. Having mastered the ability to count meant a)
to always use same sequence of counting words, b) use only one counting word
per object, c) using the last counting word to represent the total (quantity of
items in set), d) realizing that any set of objects could be counted, and e)
understanding that objects could be counted in any order. The ability of the child
to count and repeat counting word as the answer became a learned social
convention, or learned response, when questioned by the researchers it did not
prove comprehension that quantities were equal. When questions were rephrased
to the children asking them hand the total number of items to the researchers,
they did not know how many items was the correct amount to give.
Critics do not have proper understanding of
Piaget’s writing (1998 Lourenco and Mechado 1996) (Bond & Tryphon 2007). Post-
Piaget research “works” in proving children have the ability to understand
value of cardinal numbers ONLY because they do not involve the Piaget
definition of what number is: a necessary synthesis of both ordinality and
cardinality. Critics did not include Piaget definition of number in their research;
therefore, their arguments against Piaget are invalid. (Desrochers, 2008)
Causality: Piaget’s
critics further misunderstand his work regarding a child’s understanding of
physical causality by making the mistake of only referring to his earlier books
The Child’s Conception of the World (1929/1930) and
The Child’s Conception of Physical Reality (1927/1930). These books only organized children’s
explanations for natural occurring (physical) phenomena. His later books Understanding Causality (1971/1974), La Transmission des mouvements (1972), and
Epistemology and Phycology of Functions (1968/1977) were the books that
involved his ideas of how children reasoned out mechanical causation. Not only
were his critics using the wrong material to compare research but Piaget’s
ideas of causality were not fully developed until during the 1960’s at the
International Centre for Genetic Epistemology (ICGE). So without a clear model
to compare, post-Piaget critics have no valid argument to go against Piaget.
Genevan
researchers = (Piaget) do not recognize that young children still in the
preoperational stage of development can fully process all aspects of mechanical
causation and they are correct. Children can form two-term cause and effect relationships
for example; two balls colliding. When one ball moves at a higher rate of speed
children can see that it causes the second ball to be projected further. This
understanding is very basic and can be represented by a formula y = f(x)
distance of projected ball = f (amount of force from the first ball). If any
other terms are involved preoperational children have trouble explaining the
relationship of the added term. Only older children in the concrete operational
stage can easily understand a three-term relationship, Piaget said these
children have reached a level of understanding composition of functions leading
to a basic understanding of more sophisticated models. The research of Piaget’s critics (1980’s) state
that Piaget is wrong, and preoperational children can understand causality
because in their experiments Shultz (1982) was able to see that children
understood which apparatus caused a certain effect, for example choosing a lamp
as the cause of a spot of light. However, this understanding of causality
relates only to the simple formula Piaget discovered in preoperational
children, it does not mean the children have reached an understanding similar
to the concrete operational children who understand three-term cause and effect
relationships. When all the aspects of Piaget’s (Genevan) developmental model
are properly taken into account it is difficult to relate the work of
post-Piaget’s critics. Again, it is necessary to understand that the ideas of
Piaget were not fully carried out until later research completed from 1955-1980
by his supporters at the ICGE. Research done by his supporters became known as
“The Genevan Models” and should be taken into account when evaluating how
relevant Piaget actually was in the understanding of child cognitive
development.
Finally, in
an article written by Armando Machado (1996) ten of the most common criticisms
to Piaget’s ideas are tackled and corrected proving that Piaget was and still
is a crucial part to the understanding of children’s cognitive skills and
development. One incorrect argument that is often citied is that Piaget’s
theory establishes age norms and the new post-Piaget research disconfirms these
norms. This is a huge misconception of Piaget’s theory; age is not a criterion
to defining a developmental level. According to Piaget the key element was the
sequence of cognitive transformations - starting first from sensorimotor, then
moving to preoperational, followed by operational, and then finally reaching
the developmental level of formal thinking – age as merely an indicator as to
which developmental level the child currently possesses it is not the element
of which the current level is based on. Critics of Piaget thought that if they
were able to show that children who were below the age 11-12 can demonstrate
deductive reasoning skills, this would constitute formal thought.(Ennis, 1982)
Critics thought that is children who were below 11-12 could possess formal
thought patterns this would disprove Piaget. Researchers established tests that
showed children of age 5-6 could in fact show simple reasoning and deductive
skills. Children were able to correctly conclude that “Mary is at school” from
the following reasoning exercise: “If John is at school, then Mary is also at
school. John is at school; what can we say about Mary?” Piaget himself refuted this argument stating
that the ability to solve these problems based on perceived logic does not
prove a child is using formal operations because when using formal operations
the subject must show the ability to comprehend, envision, and select the
correct answer from all possible outcomes. Perhaps on the surface it may appear
that Piaget’s critics have on occasion disproved him with they’re contrary
research, but when examined more closely and when all major aspects of Piaget’s theory of development are
incorporated it is clear to see that the findings of many post-Piaget research
is not comparable to Piaget’s and in no way dismiss his contribution to the
world of psychology
Bullock, M., Gelman, R.,
& Baillargeon, R. (1982). The development of causal reasoning. In W. J.
Friedman (Ed.), The development psychology of time (pp. 209–254). New York: Academic
Press.
Cowan, R. (1987). When do
children trust counting as a basis for relative number judgements? Journal
of Experimental Child Psychology, 43, 328–345.
Desrochers, S. (2008). From Piaget to Specific
Genevan Developmental Models. Child Development Perspectives, 2(1),
7-12. doi:10.1111/j.1750-8606.2008.00034.x
Gelman, R., Bullock, M.,
& Meck, E. (1980). Preschoolers’ under- standing of simple object
transformations.Child Development, 51, 691–699.
Greco,
P. (1960). Recherches sur quelques formes d’infe ́ rences arithme ́tiques et
sur la compre ́hension de l’ite ́ration nume ́rique chez l’enfant. In P. Gre
́co, J. B. Grize, S. Papert, & J. Piaget (Eds.), Proble`mes de la
construction du nombre (pp. 149–213). Paris, France:
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Lourenço, O., & Machado, A. (1996). In
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